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ARTISTS' STATUTORY DROIT MOR L IN
CALIFORNIA: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
By John G Petrovich *
I. INTRODUCTION
It is generally accepted that the visual artist owns the rights to ex-
ploit the economic value of his creations. These patrimonial or pecuni-
ary rights, falling collectively under the familiar rubric of copyright,
exist in largely the same form both in the United States and throughout
the world.' Many countries outside of the United States, however,
have also recognized that the artist has certain personal rights in his
work, which rights are retained by the artist even after a work is sold.
The most popular name identifying this bundle of personal rights
is the French term droit moral, loosely translated as "moral rights."2 In
those countries where drolt moral exists, it has been acknowledged that
the work of art is a statement of the artist's personality. In order to
protect the creator's artistic reputation, which is built upon such tangi-
ble expressions of personality, the artist has been given certain legal
rights with respect to his creations, including the right to control the
creative process, the right to withhold his works from public disclosure,
the right to have his name associated with his creations, and the right to
prevent alteration of the creation which might damage its integrity.
3
Although the doctrine has been developed most extensively in France
and other European civil law countries,' many other nations recognize
* B.S. 1977, Business Administration, University of Southern California; J.D. 1980,
U.C.L.A.; Member, State Bar of California.
I. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (Supp. 1I 1979) (United States Copyright Act); The
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Text, July 24,
1971) (international copyright act with 28 listed signatories), reprinted in 4 M. NiMMER,
NiMMEPR ON COPYmIGHT app. 27 (1981) [hereinafter cited as M. NIMMER]; Universal Copy-
right Convention (Paris Text, July 24, 1971) (international copyright act adopted by at least
12 countries, including the United States), reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER, supra, at app. 25.
2. For the purpose of this article, the terms droit moral, moral rights, personal rights,
and rights of personality are used interchangeably.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 22-52.
4. For translations from the texts of the moral rights provisions of France, Germany,
and Italy, and for the text of the Berne Convention moral rights provision, see J. MEnn-
RYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHIcs AND THE VISUAL ARTs 4-4 through 4-7 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MERRYMAN & ELSEN].
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droit moral in one form or another.5
Perhaps due in part to a feeling that drolt moral is at odds with
America's collective legal and proprietary sensibilities, 6 and in part to
an acceptance of the assertions of some courts and legal commentators
that equivalent rights may be exercised by American artists through the
application of existing common law doctrine,7 American artists have
never benefited from explicit recognition of moral rights.' Until re-
cently, there has been little movement on the part of either the federal
government or individual states to introduce moral rights legislation.
On January 1, 1980, however, the California Art Preservation Act9
(Act) became effective, making California the first state to provide spe-
cific statutory protection for the moral rights of visual artists. The Act
provides for the protection of the most important moral rights-the
right of the artist to have his authorship recognized,10 known as the
right ofpaternity, and the right to prevent unauthorized or intentional
alteration of his work, 1I known as the right of integrity. Moreover, by
also allowing the artist, for good reason, to prevent the association of
his name with a work,12 and providing sanctions against one who com-
pletely destroys a work as opposed to altering or defacing it,' 3 the Act
expands upon the traditional moral rights and recognizes interests not
explicitly protected by the Act's European predecessors.
Unfortunately, however, the Act has several drawbacks. These
flaws include a troubling definition of the works of art that are pro-
tected, which may prove too narrow in many cases, and too broad in
others. Also, the new protection against destruction may be in conflict
5. Comment, Copyright: Moral Right-A Proposal, 43 FORDHAM L. Rav. 793, 797
(1975). The author states that droit moral is recognized by more than 63 nations throughout
the world.
6. See Merryman, he Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1043
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Merryman, Bernard Buffet].
7. This paper will not focus on the American common law analogs to European moral
rights. For a complete discussion of these American substitutes and their shortcomings, see
Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Treece, .4merican Law Analogues]; Comment, Toward Artisdc
Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American Legal Doc-
trines, 60 GEo. L.J. 1539 (1972) [hereinafter cited as TowardAlrtistic Integrity].
8. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976);
Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyter.
Church, 194 Misc. 570, 575, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1949) (all holding that the doctrine of droit
moral has never explicitly been adopted by any United States jurisdiction).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982).
10. Id § 987(d).
11. Id § 987(c)(1).
12. Id § 987(d).
13. Id § 987(e).
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with traditional American property law notions of an owner's right to
dispose of his property in any way he sees fit. The Act also deals inade-
quately with works of art incorporated into usable objects and build-
ings. Finally, the group of persons which has been granted standing to
enforce the moral rights of the artist has been so sharply limited that
the public interest in preserving the integrity of artistic creations, recog-
nized by the Act,14 may not be adequately safeguarded.
After a brief survey of the development of droit moral in EuropeI5
and an analysis of the Act, 6 these problems will be discussed and sug-
gestions for change offered. First, while this article will not attempt the
impossible task of developing an all-inclusive definition of fine art, it
will propose amendments to the Act and suggest guidelines and consid-
erations to which courts should be sensitive when interpreting the stat-
utory language.' 7 Second, this article will examine the right of integrity
and conclude that there is sufficient justification for limiting an art
owner's property rights in this manner through the state's police
power.' 8 Third, the lack of attention given to the problem of art on
usable objects and buildings will be discussed, and statutory changes
will be suggested.' 9 Finally, this article will discuss the possibility that,
after the death of the artist, those who have been given standing to
enforce the artist's moral rights may not be able or willing to protect
the interests of either the artist or the public, and will suggest that the
California Arts Council2° be given standing to enforce the artist's moral
rights in certain circumstances. 2'
14. Id § 987(a).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 22-52.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 53-71.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 72-102.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 103-25.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 126-31.
20. The California Arts Council is an arm of the state government. It is composed of
eleven members; the Speaker of the Assembly and the Senate Rules Committee each ap-
point one member to represent the general public, and the Governor appoints the remaining
nine members. In making these appointments, the Governor "shall giye consideration to the
various art disciplines and ethnic and geographic parts of the state." CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 8751(a) (West 1980).
The Arts Council is vested with, among other powers, complete authority to adopt regu-
lations, hold hearings, execute agreements, and perform any acts necessary and proper to:
(1) encourage artistic awareness, participation, and expression; (2) help independent local
groups develop their own art programs; (3) promote the employment of artists and those
skilled in crafts in both public and private sectors; (4) provide for the exhibition of artwork
in public buildings throughout California; and (5) enlist the aid of all state agencies in the
task of ensuring the fullest expression of artistic potential. Id § 8753(a)-(o).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 132-52.
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II. THE MORAL RIGHTS OF THE ARTIST
A. Traditional Perceptions of Moral Right Under European Law
Moral rights have been said to include "non-property attributes of
an intellectual and moral character which give legal expression to the
intimate bond which exists between a literary or artistic work and its
author's personality."' These rights are to be distinguished from patri-
monial or property rights-rights designed to protect the pecuniary in-
terest of an author in his work-which are protected both in the United
States and abroad through the vehicle of copyright.23 The rights of
personality are designed to safeguard the artist's reputation24 and in-
clude the right to create and disclose the work of art, the right to with-
draw the work from public view, the right to have the artist's name
associated with the creation, and the right to have the integrity of the
work respected.
1. Creation, disclosure, and withdrawal rights
The first of the artist's moral rights quite naturally attaches at the
beginning of the creative process. The artist alone has the right to cre-
ate or not to create a particular work, and cannot be forced to create or
publish against his will.' Such a right would come into play, for in-
stance, when an artist has contracted to paint a work, then fails or re-
fuses to perform. Since the act of creation is so closely related to the
personal and moral interests of the artist, his honor, and his reputa-
tion,26 several authors suggest that an artist's failure to complete a work
due to lack of inspiration cannot even be considered a breach of con-
tract, unless his refusal to complete the work was made in bad faith.
27
22. Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artits Under French
Law, 16 Am. J. CoMP. L. 465,465 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Sarraute, French MoralfRtht].
23. Merryman, Bernard Bufet, supra note 6, at 1025; Sarraute, French Moral Right,
supra note 22, at 465. For citations to the copyright acts of the United States and foreign
nations, see supra notes 1 & 4.
24. Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 6, at 1025; Strauss, The Moral Right of the
Author, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L. 506, 506 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Strauss, Moral Right].
25. Strauss, Moral Right, supra note 24, at 511.
26. Id
27. It is fair to say that in agreements whose object is the production of a work of
art, the artist's failure constitutes a normal risk, one which is foreseen by all parties.
The artist could be held responsible only if it were established that he refused in
bad faith to execute the contract-for example, if he were to transfer the canvas,
which he claimed to be unworthy of him, to a third party at a higher price.
Sarraute, French Moral Right, supra note 22, at 468.
The case law, however, does not bear out this feeling. The classic case cited on this
point is Judgment of Mar. 14, 1900 (Eden c. Whistler), Cass. civ. Ire, Paris, 1900 Recucil
P6riodique et Critique [D.P.] I 497. In 1893, Lord Eden commissioned American artist
[Vol. 15
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Closely related to the right of creation is the right of disclosure.
This right empowers the artist to decide when and how to communicate
his completed work to the public, or whether to do so at all. Until the
work is completed to the satisfaction of the artist,
it remains a mere expression of [the artist's] personality, and
has no existence beyond that which he tentatively intends to
give it. It is only a rough draft, and no one but the artist can
have any rights in it. Only the [artist] can decide whether his
work corresponds to his original conception, at what moment
it is completed, and whether it is worthy of him.28
An interesting example of the exercise of this right involved the
French painter Camoin.29 Dissatisfied with several completed can-
vases, he slashed and discarded them. Some of the discarded works
were found, restored, and sold to writer Francois Carco. The paintings
were subsequently offered for sale as a part of Carco's private collec-
tion, and were attributed to Camoin. Upon his discovery of the pro-
posed sale, the artist had the paintings seized, and asked that they be
destroyed--or, more accurately, redestroyed. The Paris Court of Ap-
peal declared that the painter had the right "during his lifetime to sur-
render his work to the public only in such a manner and under such
James Abbott McNein Whistler to paint Lady Eden's portrait for an unspecified price "be-
tween" 100 and 150 guineas. Whistler completed the portrait, Brown and Gold, Portrait of
Lady E, for which Lord Eden gave Whistler a check for 100 guineas. Whistler was insulted
by this amount-but cashed the check nonetheless-and proceeded to paint out Lady Eden's
head, substitute another, and refuse to deliver the painting to Lord Eden. Eden sued to
require the restoration of Lady Eden's face to the portrait, and to force Whistler to deliver
the work.
Although the trial court found for Lord Eden on all counts, on appeal it was held that
while Whistler could be required to pay damages for breach of contract, he could not be
forced to perform the contract or to deliver the work. Most text writers agree that general
refusal of the court to order specific performance of the contract is based on the artist's
moral right to control the creation of his work. Strauss, MoralPj'ght, supra note 24, at 511 &
n.5; see also Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 6, at 1024; Sarraute, French MoralRight,
supra note 22, at 467-68 (both discussing the Whistler case).
Another case illustrates the importance of the right to create. In Judgment of Nov. 15,
1966 (Guille c. Colmant), Cour d'appel, Paris, 1976 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence
[D.S. Jur.] 284, a dealer sued an artist for breach of a production contract. The contract
required the artist to produce at least 20 paintings a month for the dealer for a period of ten
years. The artist was either to leave the paintings unsigned, or sign a pseudonym to them.
The court nullified the contract, finding that the sustained rate of production was "destined
inevitably to injure his reputation." Sarraute, French Moral Riht, supra note 22, at 479. A
more direct theory would have been to nullify the production provisions as an infringement
of the artist's right to control the creative act.
28. Sarraute, French Moral Right, supra note 22, at 467; see also Merryman, Bernard
Buffet, supra note 6, at 1028; Strauss, Moral Right, supra note 24, at 512.
29. Judgment of Mar. 6, 1931 (Carco c. Camoin), Cour d' appel, Paris, 1931 D.P. II. 88.
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conditions as he sees fit," and stated that "although whoever gathers up
the pieces [of the destroyed paintings] becomes the undisputed owner
of them through possession, this ownership is limited to the physical
quality of the fragments, and does not deprive the painter of the moral
right which he always retains over his work."3 The Court held that
Camoin had the right to oppose the restoration of his partially de-
stroyed works, and also to demand that they again be destroyed.31
While the rights of creation and disclosure allow an artist to sup-
press a creation before its publication, the right of withdrawal "envis-
ages a situation where an author concludes that his work is no longer
acceptable to him, and he, therefore, wishes to withdraw it from public
circulation."' 32 The rationale is that after the artist has undergone a
change of conviction, he may view his past works as "obsolete"3 3 and
not an accurate portrayal of his present view of the world. The past
works, now a detraction from his present reputation, should be with-
drawn from public view.
These creation and withdrawal rights are generally thought to be
of lesser importance among the artist's moral rights in those countries
where they are recognized,34 and commentators see no compelling neid
to include them in any American version of a moral rights statute. As
to the rights of creation and disclosure, Professors Nimmer and Price
feel that they are adequately covered by traditional copyright law.3"
On the other hand, the right of withdrawal has never existed in the
United States under copyright, or any common law doctrine.36 The
right has been criticized as having a dubious legal basis and limited
30. Sarraute, French MoralgRiht, supra note 22, at 468.
31. Id Summaries of other disclosure cases may be found in Sarraute, French Moral
Right, supra note 22, at 469-73.
32. Nimner & Price, Moral Rights and Beyond: Considerations for the College Art
Association, at 2 (Jan. 5, 1976) (unpublished manuscript in the author's files) [hereinafter
cited as Nimmer & Price, Moral Rights and Beyond].
33. Strauss, Moral Right, supra note 24, at 513.
34. Id at 507-11; see also Nimmer & Price, Moral Rights and Beyond, supra note 32, at
2 (recognizing rights of paternity and integrity as the most important of the moral rights).
35. Nimmer & Price, Moral Rights and Beyond, supra note 32, at 1-2. The right of
disclosure, or of first publication, was recognized prior to 1978 under the doctrine of com-
mon law copyright. The 1909 copyright law, formerly 17 U.S.C. § 2, provided: "Nothing in
this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an
unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use
of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor."
The new copyright act specifically preempts common law copyright for all works cre-
ated after January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. 1II 1979). Now, this same right of first
publication is a part of federal copyright law.
36. Nimmer & Price, Moral Rights and Beyond, supra note 32, at 2; Treece, American
Law Analogues, supra note 7, at 500.
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usefulness even in those countries which purport to recognize it.37 In a
practical sense, its exercise is sharply curtailed in many such countries
by the requirement that the artist indemnify the owner of the work of
art for damages caused by the artist's exercise of his withdrawal right.38
Presumably, this requirement would have the effect of forcing the artist
to "buy" the work from the owner at prevailing market prices.
Although the creation and disclosure rights may arguably be pro-
tected by corollary American legal doctrines, there are two aspects of
droit moral for which no true equivalent exists. These rights-pater-
nity and integrity-are truly the core of droit moral, and have, over the
years, proved to be the most meaningful to visual artists.
2. The right of paternity
An artist's moral right of paternity protects him in three situations.
First, he may prevent the association of his name with a work he did
not create. Second, he may oppose the attribution of his own work to
another. Finally, the artist may insist that he be recognized as the au-
thor of his work.39
In France, the right of paternity is unassignable and perpetual.40
The right has had a wide range of applications, running from the men-
tion of the author's name in advertisements, to questions of collabora-
tors' rights, to protection of the artist's signature, among others.41
Some examples will serve to illustrate this right.
The French painter, Guille, entered into a production contract
with his dealer, the terms of which obligated Guille to turn over his
entire production to the dealer for a period often years. The agreement
also provided that Guille would sign a pseudonym to the works deliv-
ered to the dealer, while leaving all his other creations unsigned. After
37. Strauss, MoralRight, supra note 24, at 513. One commentator has suggested that an
author or artist who modifies his style has only one recourse: to express this style in a new
work. "In this sense every work constitutes a critique of an author's previous creations."
Sarraute, French Moral Right, supra note 22, at 477.
38. See, e.g., Article 32, Law of March 11, 1957, 57-296, [1957] J.O. 2723, [1957] B.L.D.
197 [hereinafter cited as Law of March 11, 1957], quoted in Sarraute, French Moral Right,
supra note 22, at 477. M. Sarraute, however, feels that this right of withdrawal upon indem-
nification is applicable only to literary works. Where fine arts are involved, Article 29 of the
Law of March 11, 1957, provides that since moral rights exist apart from the physical work
of art, the artist may not require that the physical object be returned in order for him to
exercise the moral rights. Id
39. Strauss, Moral Right, supra note 24, at 508; TowardArtistic Integrity, supra note 7, at
1540-41.
40. See Article 6 of the Law of March 11, 1957, supra note 38, quotedin Sarraute, French
Moral Right, supra note 22, at 478.
41. Sarraute, French Moral Right, supra note 22, at 478.
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a dispute arose, Guille began to sign his own name to his works, and
the dealer sued Guille for breach. Even though it did not appear that
the artist was either forced into this contract, or that he lacked the ca-
pacity to contract, the Court of Appeal of Paris held that the dealer
could not prohibit Guille from signing his own name to each of his
works.42
Another case involved the right of an unnamed collaborating artist
to have his authorship recognized along with that of the master artist.
Sculptor Richard Guino sued for recognition as a coauthor and for a
share of the authorship and reproduction rights in several sculptures,
which had been released only under the name of the famed painter
Renoir. Guino claimed that the sculptures were executed by himself
alone, with only minimal direction from Renoir, who was then aging
and partially paralyzed. Guino himself had, over the years, allowed
the works to be reproduced under Renoir's signature alone, and on sev-
eral occasions had even authenticated the signature of Renoir on the
works; in his old age, however, Guino desired to share in the profits of
his work. After hearing much expert testimony, the court held that
Guino had imparted sufficient amounts of his own personality to the
sculpture to be recognized as a coauthor, entitling him to share in fu-
ture royalties.
43
Closely associated to the right of paternity is the artist's right to
have the physical integrity of his work respected. Paternity and integ-
rity rights share a common base, for both rights relate to the propriety
and effect on the artist's reputation of the association of his name with
his creations. The rights differ, however, in the respect that the pater-
nity right allows an artist to compel the association of his name with his
creations, while the right of integrity envisions a situation where such
an association between the artist's name and a creation that has been
subsequently altered is misleading and erroneous, for to deform an art-
ist's work is to "present him to the public as the creator of a work not
his own, and thus make him subject to criticism for work he has not
done."
42. Judgment of Nov. 15, 1966 (Guille c. Colmant), Cour d'appel, Paris, 1976 Recueil
Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence D.S. Jur. 284. Summaries of the case appear in Merryman, Ber-
nard Buffet, supra note 6, at 1024, and Sarraute, French MoralRight, supra note 22, at 478-
79.
43. Judgment of Jan. 11, 1971 (Guino c. Consorts, Renoir), Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 1971
Juris-Classeur PNriodique, la semaine juridique [J.C.P. II] No. 16697 (English translation
reprintedin F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART WoRKs: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 18 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as FELDMAN & WELL]).
44. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
[Vol. 15
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3. The right of integrity
Professor Merryman has noted that the notion of integrity is that
"the work of art is an expression of the artist's personality. Distortion,
dismemberment or misrepresentation of the work mistreats an expres-
sion of the artist's personality, affects his artistic identity, personality
and honor, and thus impairs a legally protected personality interest. '45
The classic example of a violation of the right of integrity occurs when
the owner of a work of art alters it in some way and then continues to
display the altered work.
One of the more notable cases involved the dismemberment of a
refrigerator which. had been decorated by Bernard Buffet. The artist
had painted six distinct panels on the refrigerator-one on each side,
one on the top, and three on the door-but signed the refrigerator only
once, designating it a single, integrated work of art. The refrigerator
was auctioned with several similarly decorated refrigerators done by
other artists, with the proceeds going to charity. Several months later,
Buffet noticed that an auction catalog offered a single "painting on
metal" attributed to him. Further investigation revealed that the paint-
ing was actually one of the six panels from the refrigerator which had
been severed from the door. Buffet brought an action against the own-
er to prevent the sale of the panel, and prevailed.'
Creators, 53 HARv. L. REv. 554, 569 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Roeder, Doctrine ofMoral
Right].
45. Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 6, at 1027.
46. Judgment of June 7, 1960 (Buffet c. Fersing), Cour d'appel, Paris, 1962 Dalloz, Juris-
prudence [D. Jur.] 570, summarized in Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 6, at 1023.
Buffet sought, among other relief, to have the owner prohibited from transferring any of the
six panels, and to have them awarded to him as damages. On the first claim, the trial court
only prohibited the owner from disposing of the separate panels publicly, stating that only
such public disposition was a serious enough violation of Buffet's moral rights to justify the
requested limitation of the owner's property rights.
Buffet appealed this ruling, and was successful in having the trial court judgment re-
vised to prohibit any disposition of the individual panels, public or private. The result
reached by the appellate court is clearly the correct one, but the use of the words "public"
and "private" is misleading, and serves only to confuse the issues, insofar as "public" is
commonly understood to describe a sale of an altered work at an auction or through a
gallery, and "private" to characterize an unadvertised, negotiated sale of such a work be-
tween a buyer and seller. It is submitted that in terms of an artist's moral rights and the
interests protected thereby, both categories of transactions are sufficiently public to do sub-
stantial damage to an artist's reputation, and that there can be no purely "private" disposi-
tion. If the seller of an altered painting represents it as being a work by Buffet to only a
single buyer, who in turn represents it as such only to his houseguests who view the work in
the buyer's sitting room, Buffet's personality and reputation are still being misrepresented to
the public, albeit only the limited sector of the public comprised of the buyer and his
houseguests.
Buffet's other prayer for relief-that the six panels be awarded to him as damages-was
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Although such cases of the physical defacement of artworks repre-
sent the most extreme violations, the right of integrity has been success-
fully invoked in a myriad of contexts which do not involve the actual
alteration of the original work of art. Some of these contexts include
attempts to publish flawed reproductions of an artist's work,47 the re-
moval of part of a set of opera stage settings from a stage production
which was necessitated by the cutting of a scene,48 and the mounting of
a major retrospective exhibition of an artist's woik which, according to
the artist, underrepresented his later works.49 Such cases make it clear
that the touchstone of traditional drot moral doctrine is the protection
of the honor and reputation of the artist, with the protection of the
work of art itself being only incidental.
The apparent overriding concern for remedying public affronts to
denied by the trial court, and the appellate court upheld this portion of the judgment. Doc-
trinally, such a result is defensible, in that had the court granted Buffet's request, the artiit
would in effect have been allowed to exercise his right of withdrawal without meeting the
requirement that the owner be indemnified for his loss. See supra notes 28-38 and accompa-
nying text. Query, though, whether the artist should be given more freedom to withdraw a
work free from the indemnification requirement when the reason for the withdrawal is an
intentional alteration by the owner rather than an arbitrary determination on the part of the
artist that his past work is "obsolete."
47. See, ag., Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 6, at 1029. Professor Merryman
discusses the case wherein a son of the late painter J.F. Millet intervened in a suit between
publishers concerning which one had the right to publish a reproduction of Millet's The
Angelus. The son was successful in enjoining both publishers, claiming that neither version
was a true, undistorted representation of Millet's work. The court stated that the reproduc-
tions "brightened the light in the painting, made objects look real and vulgar, added a bon-
net on one person's head and a scarf around a woman's neck, and changed an evening scene
to one suffused by a glaring noonday sun." Id The court determined that no one who
looked at either reproduction could have believed that Millet was a great artist.
In another case, a granddaughter of artist Henri Rousseau was successful in claiming
that the use in a store window display of reproductions of the artist's work in which the
images and colors were altered constituted a violation of the right of integrity. Id at 1030.
48. See id at 1029-31. Ferdinand LUger was commissioned to design stage settings for
an opera. In a subsequent production of the opera one scene was cut, and hence the stage
setting for that scene was never shown. Ldger claimed that the theatre's actions violated his
right of integrity in the stage settings.
The court held that the stage settings indeed constituted an integrated work of art wor-
thy of moral rights protection, but also noted that the rights of the composer and producer of
the opera to control the production of the opera were also involved. The court ordered that
all future advertisements concerning the opera must contain a statement attributing author-
ship of the settings to Lger and noting that the particular setting in dispute was not shown
because of the removal of a scene from the opera.
49. See id at 1032. The trial court noted that the exhibition of Italian artist Gioro De
Chirico's work "would be viewed as a critical and representative exhibition of the artist's
work, that it would strongly affect the public estimation of the artist, and that accordingly
the artist had a legally protectable interest in being accurately and fairly represented in it."
Id
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the honor and reputation of the artist, with only an incidental concern
for the original work of art, can produce anomalous results. For exam-
ple, if the owner of a house commissions a mural depicting several
nude figures and sometime later, responding to a streak of prudishness,
has the figures "clothed" by another artist, a clear violation of the first
artist's moral rights exists." However, if the owner had instead com-
pletely obliterated or otherwise destroyed the entire mural, the weight
of authority in the case law and commentary would hold that no viola-
tion had taken place.51 The theory behind the right of integrity is, as
previously discussed, that defacement of a work of art presents to the
public an altered work that may affect the artist's legally protected in-
terest in his artistic honor and reputation. If the artwork is completely
destroyed, however, there is nothing remaining to be impugned by pub-
lic opinion, and hence there is no moral rights violation.
This viewpoint has been strongly disputed by at least one com-
mentator, and has not been followed in some cases.52 The legal impact
of the destruction of fine art continues to be an object of controversy in
50. See Judgment of June 8, 1912 (Felsenerland mit Sirenen), Reichsgericht, Berlin,
1912 Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen [RGZJ 397, dircussedin Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra
note 6, at 1038 n.56.
51. Nimmer & Price, Moral Rights and Beyond, supra note 32, at 9; L. DuBoFF, THE
DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 844 (1978) [hereinafter cited as DESKBOOK]; Roeder, Doctrine of
Moral RIght, supra note 44, at 569; Comment, "he Moral Rights of the Author: A Compara-
ape Study, 71 DicK. L. REv. 93, 94 (1966).
In Judgment of Apr. 27, 1934 (Lacasse et Welcome c. Abb6 Quenard), Cour d'appel,
Paris, 1934 Recueil Hebdomadaire de Jurisprudence [D.H. Jur.] 385, the dispute arose out of
a commission awarded to Lacasse to paint frescoes in a chapel in a French town. The fres-
coes were completed without the knowledge or permission of the bishop, who owned the
chapel. Upon hearing of the frescoes and the criticism they were attracting, he inspected the
chapel, found the frescoes to be unacceptable even with substantial modification, and or-
dered them obliterated. The artist sued, but the trial court upheld the property rights of the
bishop over the moral rights of Lacasse. Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 6, at 1034.
Also, in the case alluded to in the text concerning the nude figures in the mural, the
court noted in dicta that there would have been no moral rights violation had the owner
completely destroyed or removed the mural. Id at 1038 n.56.
52. Professors Merryman and Elsen believe that the question of whether the destruction
of a work of art constitutes a violation of the artist's moral rights is all but well-settled. They
discuss a case involving artist Raymond Sudre which arose out of a commission given to the
artist by his home village to decorate a fountain. The resulting sculpture-a woman dressed
in local garb-was not well-maintained against the abuse of birds, nature and the local
children. The city decided to have the sculpture removed and destroyed. On a visit to the
village, Sudre discovered the destruction, and also found that the pieces of the statue had
been used as fill for road repairs. He brought a damage action based on moral rights and
won. Judgment of Apr. 3, 1936 (Sudre c. Commune de Baixas), Conseil d'dtat, Paris, 1936
D.P. 11 57, discussed in MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 4, at 4-26. Professors Merryman
and Elsen also cite an Italian case which indicated that the total destruction of a work of art
violates the artist's moral rights. Id (citing Judgment of Mar. 25, 1955 (Ente autonomo "La
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.the development of moral rights doctrine, and one that should be re-
solved definitively both in those countries where drofl moral presently
exists, and in any new statutory moral rights proposal. The Act, the
provisions of which will be explained now, breaks some new ground in
this respect, while at the same time introducing into American law the
most important traditional elements of drolt moral.
B. The California Art Preservation Act
The Act, as it emerged from the legislative process, is a compli-
cated scheme of rights and duties, containing many definitions, qualifi-
cations to, and exclusions from protection. The Act's practical
application remains a mystery, for there have been no reported cases
decided under it since it became effective on January 1, 1980. The fol-
lowing analysis of the Act's provisions will shed some light on how
such application may take shape, and will also show that as the Act
evolved through various drafts, its provisions were the subject of much
debate and compromise on key issues concerning the extent of protec-
tion given by, and the ability to enforce, the moral rights created.
The Act adopts the right of paternity by providing that "the artist
shall retain at all times the right to claim authorship, or, for just and
valid reason, to disclaim authorship of his or her work of fine art.' 53
The latter clause, concerning the right to disclaim authorship, repre-
sents an interesting addition, not found in a prior version of the Act.54
Although this notion fits comfortably into traditional droll moral doc-
Biennale' di Venezia c. De Chirico), Corte app., Venezia, 1955 Foro Italiano [Foro It.] I
717).
Furthermore, Professor Merryman notes that the murals which were the subject of the
Lacasse case, s.upra note 51, were painted without the knowledge and consent of the owner
of the property, and that the result might have been different had the owner personally
commissioned the murals and known of their content beforehand.
One French commentator argues that even under French moral right, the artist's repu-
tation is not the primary focus of protection. M. Sarraute has expressed the view that after
several redistillations, the moral right of the artist is currently understood to have as its main
object the assurance of respect for the work of art itself. Sarraute, French MoralRight supra
note 22, at 466.
Sarraute also notes that if the primary goal was indeed to protect reputation, several
unacceptable consequences might follow. For example, he says that a painter might attempt
to control the conditions surrounding the resale of his works, such as opposing a large sale
that would lower prices and thereby ruin the artist's name. Id at 479. If it is the case that
the work of art itself is now the object of protection, it is proper that the public interest and
the right against destruction be given explicit recognition.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(d) (West 1982).
54. A version of the Act introduced in the previous legislative session set forth only the
positive right to claim authorship. S: 2143, § 987(c) (1978) (current version at CAL. Civ.
CODE § 987(d) (West 1982)).
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trine, it has not found explicit recognition even in European statutory
and case law.5
The only troubling aspect of the right to disclaim authorship is
that the Act offers no guidance in determining what constitutes a suffi-
ciently "just and valid reason" to allow the artist to disown his creation.
The language is certainly broad enough to allow an artist to disown a
work of art based only upon the artist's good faith determination that
his art has evolved so much that the prior work no longer represents his
artistic personality, thus giving the artist something along the lines of a
modified withdrawal right.56 It may be, however, that in practice the
exercise of this right to disclaim authorship will be limited to those situ-
ations where the impetus for the artist's desire to disown the work was
an alteration prohibited by the Act.
The Act protects the right of integrity by prohibiting any person,
except an artist who owns and possesses a work of fine art of his own
creation, from intentionally committing, or authorizing another inten-
tionally to commit, any act of physical defacement, mutilation, altera-
tion, or destruction of fine art.57 The commission of such acts by a
person who frames, conserves, or restores fine art would not be a viola-
tion of the Act so long as the acts were not committed as a result of
gross negligence.58
By unequivocally recognizing that the destruction of a work of fine
art violates the artist's moral rights, the Act puts an end to the confu-
sion concerning this aspect of integrify that has plagued the application
of drot moral in Europe. With respect to most works of art, then, the
Act provides an even greater degree of protection than its European
predecessors.
Curiously, though, the works of fine art which are most in danger
of being intentionally damaged or destroyed-those integrated into
55. See Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 6, at 1027 n.14. While noting that there
are no cases on point, Professor Merryman concludes that the existence of the right to dis-
claim authorship is 'in principle undebatable."
56. Although an artist's reasons for wishing to disclaim authorship of a work may be the
same as those behind his desire to withdraw it from artistic circulation, the analogy is not
complete, for the offending work of art still remains on the market after the artist merely
disclaims it. Presumably, the artist would be able to compel others not to use his name in
association with the exhibition or sale of a disclaimed work of art. What is in a name?
Query how much a painting by Picasso would bring at auction if it could not be sold as "a
Picasso."
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West 1982).
58. Id § 987(c)(2). "Gross negligence" is defined as "the exercise of so slight a degree of
care as to justify the belief that there was an indifference to the particular work of fine art."
Id
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buildings and other structures-are given a rather limited degree of
protection. The Act would not apply where the work of fine art could
not be removed from a building without substantial defacement, muti-
lation, alteration, or destruction of the work, unless the artist's moral
rights had been reserved in a writing signed by the owner of the build-
ing and duly recorded.59 If a work of art could be so removed from a
building, the provisions of the Act would apply, but only where the
artist can be successfully notified of the owner's proposed actions with
respect to the work through the owner's diligent effort, and only if the
artist is able to remove the work at his own expense within 90 days of
receiving such notice. If the artist does so remove the artwork, how-
ever, title to the work shall pass to him.60 The Act purports to protect
only works of "fine art," defined by the statute to be "an original paint-
ing, sculpture, or drawing of recognized quality. .. [other than] work
prepared under contract for commercial use by its purchaser. ' 61 In
making its determination of whether a work of fine art is of recognized
quality, "the trier of fact shall rely on the opinion of artists, art dealers,
collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, and other persons in-
volved with the creation or marketing of fine art."' 62 This definition is
significantly narrower than that contained in a prior version of the Act,
which included more classes of fine art objects and contained no quali-
ty restrictions.63
The Act further provides that the rights and interests granted shall
exist until the 50th anniversary of the artist's death,' making the term
of protection coextensive with that provided under copyright law.65 To
enforce the rights guaranteed by the Act, the artist, while he is alive, or
his heir, legatee, or personal representative if the artist is deceased,"
may commence an action for injunctive relief, actual damages, punitive
damages, attorneys' fees, and any other appropriate relief.
67
59. Id § 987(h)(1). This reservation of rights, if properly executed and recorded, is
binding on subsequent owners of the building. Id
60. Id § 987(h)(2).
61. Id § 987(b)(2).
62. Id § 987(f).
63. An earlier version of the Act defined "fine art" as "an original painting, sculpture,
drawing, work of calligraphy or work in mixed media." S. 2143, § 987(b)(2) (1978).
64. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(g)(1) (West 1982).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. III 1979). Limiting the protection of moral rights to life
plus 50 years has been criticized by Professors Nimmer and Price as being insufficient to
protect important works of antiquity. This problem is discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 135-36.
66. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(e), (g)(1); see infra note 135.
67. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(e)(1-5) (West 1982). The statute provides, however, that
when "punitive damages are awarded, the court shall, in its discretion, select an organization
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Earlier versions of the Act provided two independent avenues of
protection for the artist's reputation and his creations. The first avenue
of protection, just discussed, was based upon the recognition that an
artist has a protectable interest in his artistic personality, identity,
honor and reputation.68 The prior version of the Act also recognized,
however, that "there is a public interest in preserving the integrity of
cultural and artistic creations."6 9 The proposed version further pro-
vided that any person acting pursuant to this public interest may bring
an action to recover or obtain the same relief available to the artist,
70
and that with respect to the public interest, the rights and duties created
by the Act shall exist in perpetuity.71 The final version of the Act,
however, retained only the explicit recognition of the public interest
and deleted all means by which the public could protect this interest on
its own behalf.
The complete absence of an independent method by which the
public may protect its own interest in the artist's work is one of.several
problems with the Act to be discussed in the sections that follow. Some
of these problems are shared by the Act's European ancestors, while
others are peculiar to the Act itself; all, however, carry the potential to
cause serious and perhaps unforeseen consequences for the artist and
the public.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF THE ACT
As enacted, the Act has four major problem areas. First, the statu-
tory definition of "fine art" appears to exclude from protection many
works the integrity of which is important. Second, the right of integ-
rity, while it is the cornerstone of droit moral, seems at first blush to
conflict with American legal principles concerning an individual's use
and disposition of his property. Third, the protections of the Act may
be grossly undercut because the Act does not deal at all with the
problems surrounding works of art which are incorporated into utilitar-
ian objects, and deals in an unsatisfactory manner with works of art on
buildings. Finally, by vesting only the artist, or his heir, legatee, or
or organizations engaged in charitable or educational activities involving the fine arts in
California to receive such damages." This presumably serves to prevent the artist from
being enriched beyond his actual damages, yet still provides the means for punishing a de-
fendant who mutilates artwork when actual damages are negligible or cannot be proved.
68. S. 2143, § 987(a) (1978) (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(a) (West 1982)).
69. Id See generally Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 6, at 1041 (discussing extent
of public interest in preservation of art).
70. S. 2143, § 987(d) (1978) (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982)).
71. Id § 987(e)(1)(ii) (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(e)(1) (West 1982)).
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personal representative with the power to exercise moral rights on be-
half of the artist and the public, the public interest may be inadequately
protected when those who have been granted standing to sue are not
willing or are unavailable to protect this interest.
A. Works of Fine Art Protected by the Act
Justice Holmes stated at the beginning of the century that "[i]t
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustra-
tions, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."72 In perhaps
a more wry manner, it has been noted that "[t]he attempt to define art
is a perennial, and insoluble, problem for critics, philosophers, legisla-
tors, and people with nothing better to do."7 3 While it may not be pos-
sible to create a single, all-encompassing legal definition of fine art, it is
entirely possible to fashion a functional concept of fine art suited to a
particular purpose, such as droit moral, which speaks to the precise
rights and interests protected thereby. After the troubling aspects of
the Act's present definition are discussed, just such a functional concept
will be proposed.
1. "An original painting, sculpture, or drawing"
The French droit moral statute contains no specific definition of
protected works, but the statutory explanations of the rights, interests,
and protections of droit moral indicate that its coverage is broad, ex-
tending to all tangible or realized expressions of the mind.74 This same
72. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (suit to deter-
mine whether certain chromolithographs were "pictorial illustrations" subject to copyright);
see infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
73. M. PRICE & H. SANDISON, A GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA RESALE ROYALTIES ACT
18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PRICE & SANDISON].
74. For example, Article 2 of the Berne Convention, translatedin MERRYMAN & ELSEN,
supra note 4, at 4-6 through 4-7, defines protected works as being "every production in the
literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression."
As nonexclusive examples, the Article lists music, choreography, cinematography, drawing,
painting, architecture, sculpture, engravings and lithography, maps and photography,
among many others.
The Law of March 11, 1957, supra note 38, on the other hand, does not specifically
define which types of works are protected. Instead, the scope of protection must be "rea-
soned out" from several provisions. Basically, the law protects "works" of artists and au-
thors. Article 2 provides that works are protected "regardless of the kind, form of
expression, merit or purpose of such works.. . . [E]ach and every idea having taken form
in the mind of the author, will give birth to a work, on the condition that the aforesaid form
has itself been the object of an expression." Article 7 states that a work is deemed to have
been created when an "author's conception [has been] realized." Thus, it appears that in
[Vol. 15
19811 DROIT MORAL IN CALIFORNIA
concept is also used to establish the scope of protection for copyright
under the European statutes,75 and is very similar to the definition
adopted under American copyright law.76 The Act, on the other hand,
protects only "fine art"--a much narrower range of works defined to
include only "an original painting, sculpture, or drawing. 77
This definition is similar to the definition appearing in the Califor-
nia Resale Royalties Act,71 a version of the French drolt de suite, which
allows artists the right to obtain a percentage royalty based upon the
proceeds of certain resales made after the original transfer of the work
of art.79 One commentator, in discussing the Resale Royalties Act defi-
France, any realized conception or idea from the mind of an author is protected by drolt
moral. Tournier, The French Law of March 11, 1957 on Literary and Artistic Property, 6
BULL. COPYRIoHT SOC'Y 1, 3-4 (1958).
M. Tournier is not in favor of such a broad definition. As he has written, "[i]t appears
certainly regrettable... that the French Law has insisted on deliberately placing on the
same level the masterpieces and the simple 'realized expression' of the most modest intellec-
tual effort.' Id at 5.
75. Both the Law of March 11, 1957, supra note 38, and the multinational Berne Con-
vention for the Protection. of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Text, July 24, 1971) are
copyright statutes which also provide moral rights protection for authors and artists.
76. The United States Supreme Court's view towards the breadth of copyright protec-
tion closely parallels the definition of protected works in foreign statutes for both copyright
and moral rights protection. See, eg., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (involving copy-
right protection of a decorative table lamp). There, the Supreme Court stated that to be
copyrightable, a work must only be "original, that is, the author's tangible expression of his
ideas .... Such expression, whether meticulously delineating the model or mental image
or conveying the meaning by modernistic form or color, is copyrightable." Id at 214. In
dismissing the customs definition of fine art as too drastic a limitation on the scope of copy-
right, the Court further stated, "[i]t is clear Congress intended the scope of the copyright
statute to include more than the traditional fine arts." Id at 213.
The definitions section of the copyright act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(A)(5) (Supp. III 1979),
provides ,overage for "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." In so phrasing the defini-
tion, Congress did not intend to limit coverage to traditional works of art, but instead to
embrace
graphic art and illustrations, art reproductions, plans and drawings, photographs
and reproductions of them, maps, charts, globes, and other cartographic works,
works of these kinds intended for use in advertising and commerce, and works of
"applied art."
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5659, 5667, quoted in DESKBOOK, supra note 51, at 713; see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.10
(1979). This regulation states that a work of art, to be copyrightable, must "embody some
creative authorship in its delineation or form." The predecessor regulation, 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.8 (1979), defined protected works of art as "works of artistic craftsmanship. . . such
as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as all works belonging to the
fine arts, such as paintings, drawings and sculpture."
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West 1982).
78. CAL. Crv. CODE § 986 (West 1982). For a discussion of drolt de suite, see infra note
79.
79. Droit de suite, roughly translated as "art proceeds right," is designed to furnish vis-
ual artists with some stated portions of the increase in value of their works each time they
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nition, concludes quite justifiably that the legislature obviously meant
to exclude all other forms of the visual arts not specifically included. 0
Indeed, in drafting other definitions of fine art for other purposes, the
legislature has been more comprehensive. 81 Limiting the definition so
are resold. Statutes vary widely with respect to the types of resale covered, the percentage
royalty payable, whether the percentage is based upon the total sales price or just the
amount of any increase, and the minimum price for which an object sells before droit de
suite is brought into play. Price, Government Policy and Economic Securityfor Artists The
Case afthe Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333, 1333-34 (1968).
With regard to the rationale behind droit de suite Professor Price has written:
The droit de suite evolved from a particular conception of art, the artist, and
the way art is sold. At its core is a vision of the starving artist, with his genius
unappreciated, using his last pennies to purchase canvas and pigments which he
turns into a misunderstood masterpiece. The painting is sold for a pittance, proba-
bly to buy medicine for a tubercular wife. The purchaser is a canny investor who
travels about artists' hovels trying to pick up bargains which he will later turn into
large amounts of cash. Thirty years later the artist is still without funds and his
children are in rags;, meanwhile his paintings, now the subject of a Museum of
Modem Art restrospective and a Harry Abrams parlor-table book, fetch small for-
tunes at Park-Bernet and Christie's. The rhetoric of the droit de suite is built on
this peculiar understanding of the artist and the art market. It is the product of a
lovely wistfulness for the nineteenth century with the pure artist starving in his
garret, unappreciated by a philistine audience and doomed to poverty because of
the stupidity of the world at large. The droit de suite is La bohbme and Lustfor
Life reduced to statutory form.
Id at 1335 (footnote omitted).
80. The California Resale Royalties Act similarly defines "fine art" to mean "an original
painting, sculpture, or drawing." CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(c)(2) (West 1982). Commentators
have said of this definition that two things are clear: First, the limiting word "original"
indicates protection for only unique, one-of-a-kind artworks. Fine art multiples, such as
lithographs or silkscreens, would not be included. Second, the definition as written is signifi-
candy narrower than those appearing in other California arts-related legislation, implying
that many of the works included in the other definitions are not included here. PiucE &
SANDISON, supra note 73, at 19.
It is not clear, however, that Professor Price and Mr. Sandison are correct with regard to
their first conclusion on fine art multiples. There is general agreement within each classifica-
tion of art as to what constitutes an "original." The Print Council of America, for example,
has adopted standards regarding what features are found in an "original" print:
An original print is a work of art, the general requirements of which are:
1. The artist alone has created the master image in or upon the plate, stone,
wood block or other material, for the purpose of creating the print.
2. The print is made from the said material, by the artist or pursuant to his
directions.
3. The finished print is approved by the artist.
"What is an Original Print? (Principles Recommended by the Print Council of America),"
reprintedin FELDMAN & WEIL, supra note 43, at 441. The four major techniques for making
original prints are relief processes, incised processes, lithography and serigraphy (stencil pro-
cess or silkscreen). Id
81. See, e.g, CAL. CIV. CODE § 982(d)(1) (West 1982) (transfer of ownership of rights of
reproduction) which provides:
"Fine art" shall mean any work of visual art, including but not limited to, a
drawing, painting, sculpture, mosaic, or photograph, a work of calligraphy, a work
of graphic art (including an etching, lithograph, offset print, silk screen, or a work
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drastically appears contrary to the spirit of drolt moral, for protection
does not even extend to the broader range of visual arts, let alone all
other creative efforts.
In this regard, the definition found in the Act most closely resem-
bles the concept of "free fine arts" developed in custom and tariff case
law. At one time, only those media which were "intended solely for
ornamental purposes, and including paintings in oil and water, upon
canvas, plaster or other material, and original statuary of marble, stone
or bronze,"82 were entitled to duty-free entry into the country, and a
rather large body of case law developed concerning the narrowness and
rigidity of the "free fine arts" category.8 3 Today, however, the "free"
category has been expanded by federal regulations to include other me-
dia generally accepted as being among the visual fine arts,84 making the
Act's definition something of a statutory dinosaur.
It appears that the legislature may have been overly cautious
against extending too far such novel rights-novel, at least, to the
of graphic art of like nature), crafts (including crafts in clay, textile, fiber, wood,
metal, plastic, and like materials), or mixed media (including a collage, assem-
blage, or any combination of the foregoing art media).
See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15813.1(b) (West 1980) (similar definition applicable to the Art
in Public Buildings Act); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1738(b) (West Supp. 1982) (less comprehensive
definition applicable to statutory scheme regulating the consignment of fine art).
82. The classic categorization of works of art for customs purposes appears in United
States v. Perry, 146 U.S. 71, 74 (1892). The case arose out of the importation of stained glass
windows which had been executed by a noted European artist. In the course of its opinion
the Court noted that there were four classes of art:
1. The fine arts, properly so called, intended solely for ornamental purposes,
and including paintings in oil and water, upon canvas, plaster, or other material,
and original statuary of marble, stone or bronze ....
2. Minor objects of art, intended also for ornamental purposes, such as statu-
ettes, vases, plaques, drawings, etchings, and the thousand and one articles which
pass under the general name of bric-a-brac, and are susceptible of an indefinite
reproduction from the original.
3. Objects of art, which serve primarily an ornamental, and incidentally a
useful, purpose, such as painted or stained glass windows, tapestry, paper hang-
ings, &c.
4. Objects primarily designed for a useful purpose, but made ornamental to
please the eye and gratify the taste, such as ornamented clocks, the higher grade of
carpets, curtains, gas-fixtures, and household and table furniture.
Id at 74-75. Only the first group, the Court held, was entitled to free entry as "fine art." Id
at 75.
83. See, e.g., M.H. Garvey Co. v. United States, 65 Cust. Ct. 45 (1970); Ebeling & Reuss
Co. v. United States, 40 Cust. Ct. 387 (1958); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. United States, 49
C.C.P.A. 129 (1962); Win. S. Pitcairn Corp. v. United States, 39 C.C.P.A. 15 (1951); United
States v. Ehrlich, 22 C.C.P.A. 1 (1934); United States v. Royal Copenhagen Porcelain, Inc.,
17 C.C.P.A. 464 (1930); United States v. Olivotti & Co. 7 C.C.P.A. 46 (1916); Brancusi v.
United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928).
84. See former 19 U.S.C. § 1201, 1807, reprinted in MERRYMAN & ELsEN, supra note
4, at 3-6.
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United States-for clearly the fine arts, even in their purest form, ex-
tend far beyond the confines of the present definition in the Act. While
it is not suggested that the definition be expanded to the extent pro-
vided for under United States copyright law or French drot moral,
some broadening is desirable, if for no other reason than to avoid the
cumbersome task of the piecemeal expansion of the Act's definition by
special legislation, a task which the legislature seems already to have
embarked upon.
85
As limited as the Act's protection may seem from the foregoing, it
is not even clear that all original paintings, sculptures, and drawings
are protected. The statute carries a further restriction on the quality of
protected works which, while on its face may appear reasonable and
harmless enough, may also prove to be most pernicious if not applied
with extreme caution.
2. "[Oif recognized quality"
The Act further provides that its protections apply only to works
adjudged to be "of recognized quality." 6 Very little guidance on the
possible interpretation of this requirement may be found in either drolt
moral case law from other nations or in the commentaries. The quality
of a particular work is never in issue in other nations since the defini-
tions in their drolt moral statutes focus on the artist and the creative
process, and not on the nature and quality of the art work.
The Act itself is somewhat helpful, but in a manner that is highly
unsatisfactory. It provides that in making the determination whether
or not a specific work is "of recognized quality," the trier of fact "shall
rely on the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators
of art museums, and other persons involved with the creation or mar-
keting of fine art."87 It has been acknowledged that these are perhaps
the best sources of evidence in an area where no "hard" evidence is
available.88 By placing so much weight on the testimony of art market
85. It appears, unfortunately, that this is the course the legislature has elected to follow.
Already there has been added to the Civil Code a short section which provides: "In this
state, for any purpose, porcelain painting shall be considered a fine art and not a craft."
CAL. Cxv. CODE § 997 (West 1982). This will probably be only the first of many such enact-
ments, as artists and collectors representing different media of the fine arts pressure the
legislature for inclusion.
86. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West 1982).
87. Id § 987(f).
88. Karlen, What is Ar?: A .5etchfr a LegalDefnition, 94 LAW Q. REv. 383, 406-07
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Karlen, What is Ar?].
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"experts," however, the Act may have skewed its protections in favor of
a sometimes elitist art establishment.
This state of affairs has been accepted as a necessary evil by
those89 who view the art world as likely to provide a "complacent re-
ceptacle" for new or eccentric art forms.90 While this may indeed be
true in many cases, history is fraught with examples of the art establish-
ment, and often artists themselves, being the first and loudest to deny a
new work its place among the "fine arts." 91 There is enough evidence
of an eternal struggle between many innovative artists and the art es-
tablishment92 that a. court, in applying the Act's language, would have
to remain constantly on the alert for indications of institutionalized
bias. The prospect that a court might lapse in its duty of vigilance is
serious enough to indicate that some change is necessary with respect to
the Act's quality restriction.
With a definition of fine art so narrow and exclusive in a world of
art already so broad and constantly expanding into new media and
techniques which defy traditional classification, the Act seems certain
to administer injustice and provide inadequate protection. Though the
controversy over the seminal legal definition of fine art may, in the final
analysis, prove to be irresolvable, it is certainly possible to remove the
major flaws in the Act's present definition through amendment.
89. Id at 400.
90. Id at 385.
91. [W]henever there appears an art that is truly new and original, the men who
denounce it first and loudest are artists. Obviously, because they are the most
engaged. No critic, no outraged bourgeois, can match an artist's passion in repudi-
ation. The men who kept Courbet and Manet and the Impressionists and the Post-
Impressionists out of the salons were all painters. They were mostly academic
painters. But it is not necessarily the academic painter who defends his own estab-
lished manner against a novel way of making pictures or a threatened shift in taste.
The leader of a revolutionary movement in art may get just as mad over a new
departure or betrayal in a revolutionary cause.
L. STEINBERG, OTHER CRITERIA: CONFRONTATIONS WITH TWENTIETH CENTURY ART 4
(1972), reprinted in MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 4, at 3-26. Another art historian, in
commenting on the influence of the art academies, has noted that "academies are bound to
foster pedestrian talent and to harm genius." N. PEVSNtR, ACADEMIES OF ART, PAST &
PRESENT (1973), reprinted in MERRYMAN & ELSEN, Supra note 4, at 3-40.
92. Many artists today share a need to reach beyond traditional forms of art, and in
doing so, they more often than not implicitly reject the art establishment and its
institutions.... Many of these same artists have a greater need of these institu-
tions than ever before, to validate and define their work as art, since the works' [sic]
own boundaries are, in many cases, dematerialized or nearly dissolved. Perhaps it
is this basic (and in some cases possibly debilitating) dependency on museums
which creates the irresistable desire on the part of so many artists to pass judgment
on them, implicate them and engage them in challenges, often with a curious com-
bination of self-righteousness and unrealistic avenging zeal.
Editorial, Artists v. Museums, 70 ARTNEws 25 (May 1971).
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3. A proposal for a new definition
With regard to the range of visual arts media covered by the Act,
quite simply the statutory definition of fine art should be broadened to
bring within the Act's protection those works which are, for most pur-
poses, indisputably among the visual fine arts.
A more difficult question to address is whether any further quali-
fying criteria should be included, and, if so, what form these criteria
should take. It should be clear from the discussion above that the "rec-
ognized quality" requirement is unacceptable. It is equally clear, how-
ever, that some constraints are necessary, because the notion that
protection extends to "all tangible creations of the mind" has caused
concern among French commentators on droit moral9 3 as well as
American courts in the copyright area.94 It would seem appropriate,
given the rationale behind droit moral, that whatever constraints are
chosen, their purpose should be only to insure that the protectable in-
terest being asserted is both present and genuine.
As a step towards achieving this goal, it is suggested that section
987(b)(2), 91 the Act's definition of fine art, be amended to read:
(2) "Fine art" means any work of visual art, including
but not limited to, a drawing, painting, sculpture, mosaic, or
photograph, a work of calligraphy, a work of graphic art (in-
cluding an etching, lithograph, offset print, silkscreen, or a
work of graphic art of a like nature), crafts (including crafts in
clay, textile, fiber, wood, metal, plastic, and like materials), or
93. The French droll moral extends protection to all works "regardless of the kind, form
or expression, merit or purpose [of the work]." Tournier, The French Law ofMarch 11, 1957
on Literary and Artistic Property, 6 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 3-4 (1958). In response to
such a broad extension of protection, M. Tournier has observed that
the definition of Article 2 of the Berne Convention, as revised at Brussels, which
avoids mentioning the "merit" of the work and which, consequently, does not pre-
vent this merit from being precisely taken into consideration, seems preferable. It
appears certainly regrettable to us that the French Law has insisted on deliberately
placing on the same level the masterpieces and the simple "realized expression" of
the most modest intellectual effort.
Id at 5.
94. As Justice Douglas noted incredulously in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 220-21
(1954) (Douglas, J., concurring):
The Copyright Office has supplied us with a long list of such articles which
have been copyrighted-statuettes, book ends, clocks, lamps, doorknockers, can-
dlesticks, inkstands, chandeliers, piggy banks, sundials, salt and pepper shakers,
fish bowls, casseroles and ash trays. Perhaps these are all "writings" in the consti-
tutional sense. But to me, at least, they are not obviously so.
95. The current code defines "fine art" as "an original painting, sculpture, or drawing of
recognized quality, but shall not include work prepared under contract for commercial use
by its purchaser." CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West 1982).
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mixed media (including a collage, assemblage, or any combi-
nation of the foregoing art media) which represents a serious
creative statement of the artist's personality.
Because the "recognized quality" standard would be replaced by
the restriction that the work of fine art represent a serious creative
statement, section 987(f) also should be replaced by the following:
(a) In determining whether a work of fine art is a seri-
ous creative statement of the artist's personality, the trier of
fact shall consider, among other relevant evidence:
(1) The intention of the artist in creating the work
of fine art;
(2) The circumstances surrounding the creation of
the work of fine art; and
(3) The acceptance of the work of fine art as a seri-
ous creative statement of the artist's personality by some
segment of the artistic community or the general public.
The bulk of proposed section 987(b)(2) has been borrowed sub-
stantially unchanged from another California Civil Code provision
dealing with the transfer of ownership rights in artistic properties.96
While the proposed definition is not as broad as that of the French droit
moral or American copyright, it is a strong, functional, and, most im-
portantly, nonexclusive listing of protected visual arts media which will
provide the flexibility currently lacking in the present definition.
The only aspect which may cause concern is the inclusion of
"crafts" within the definition. What distinguishes "true" fine art from
"mere" craft is not entirely clear, but the latter category is often
thought to be of lesser importance, and hence held in lower esteem, by
artists and the public. If this is indeed so, there are likely to be few
moral rights issues concerning crafts, so their inclusion would seem to
pose few, if any, problems of administration, especially in light of the
additional definitional considerations discussed below. On balance, it
seems wise to include objects which may now be classified as "crafts"
but which, if preserved until another time, may rightfully take their
place as objects of "fine art."9 7
The most significant change, however, is the replacement of the
96. CAL. Crv. CODE § 982(d)(1) (West 1982).
97. Even if the creator intended the work to be a work of craft, this intention should not
be determinative of the art status of the work. "One reason for this is that older works which
were originally intended in another social context or historical period to be merely works of
craft or ornament may be rightfully considered works of art or 'objects of artistic interest.'
Karlen, 9hat is Art?, supra note 88, at 398.
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quality standard by the requirement that the work of fine art, to be
protected, must be "a serious creative statement of the artist's personal-
ity." This consideration is most likely to be contested in connection
with new, bizarre, nonobjective art forms. One author has noted that
there is sometimes "widespread suspicion that such art is some kind of
put-on, that the artist is laughing at the public through his painting or
sculpture.""8 Admittedly, such is often the case, and has never been
more clearly exemplified than by an incident involving the Italian artist
Manzoni. In an attempt to protest the near-commodity status of art in
the mid-1950's, the artist saved his own excrement, canned it in small
numbered tins labeled Merda d'artista, and offered them for sale at the
current market price of gold. Somewhat surprisingly, one of the little
tins showed up at a full-scale retrospective of Manzoni's work at the
Tate Gallery in London in 1973.99 Notwithstanding such examples, it
seems beyond question, given the rationale behind droll moral, that re-
gardless of how bizarre a work of art is, if the artist can establish,
through reputation or otherwise, that the work was intended to be a
serious artistic effort, this evidence should be given great weight in de-
termining whether or not the protections of droll moral should apply.
Clearly, though, the work of an artist cannot be protected solely
because the creator intends it to be a work of art, or designates it as
such, as suggested by the first proposed consideration. 10 Hence, the
second prong of the proposed amendment suggests that the trier of fact
consider evidence of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the
work. It can be said that in many cases there are certain trappings
which surround the execution of a work of art: notes, sketches, prelimi-
nary studies, small-scale models, and the like. The presence of such
items should be persuasive evidence of the seriousness of the creative
effort regardless of our independent judgments as to the ultimate suc-
cess or merit of the completed work. The absence of such evidence, on
the other hand, should not be conclusive of a lack of seriousness, for
spontaneity is as often the source of great masterpieces as is careful
planning.
Finally, the proposed amendment directs the trier of fact to con-
sider whether a work has been accepted as a serious creative statement
by some segment of the art community or the generalpublic. This third
point interjects an element of social opinion into the balance, but since
the opinion base has been broadened beyond so-called art market ex-
98. L. ADAMS, ART ON TRiAL 43-44 (1976).
99. Put h it art?, 73 ARTNEws, 68-69 (Oct. 1974).
100. See Karlen, hat ZP Art?, supra note 88, at 398-99.
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perts, this provision is not likely to introduce as strong an institutional
bias as does the Act's current "recognized quality" standard. It may
well be that an artist seeking protection for his work and reputation
will always prevail on this point, for few works of art ever meet with
universal rejection; however, as Justice Holmes said in Bleistein v. Don-
aldson Lithographing Co. 1°o with respect to extension of copyright pro-
tection, "if [works of art] command the interest of any public, they have
a commercial value-it would be bold to say that they have not an
aesthetic and educational value-and the taste of any public is not to
be treated with contempt.""02
Phrasing the definition in the manner suggested would actually
streamline the application of the Act. Under the proposed amendment,
the trier of fact would focus immediately on the artist's reputation and
personality rather than spend time assessing the quality and recogni-
tion of the artwork-issues that are at best marginally relevant.
Although the problems with the Act's definitional section can be
resolved only through substantial amendment, the questions surround-
ing the right of integrity are dealt with more easily. The crucial issues
are the extent to which the artist and the public may claim an interest
in the preservation of privately owned art, and whether the protection
of this interest infringes on rights guaranteed to property owners by the
fifth amendment to the Constitution.
B. The Right of Integrty and the Ft/Ih Amendment
It is clear that there is no right of integrity under American com-
mon law. For example, in the case of Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian
Church," 3 artist Alfred Crimi painted a large fresco depicting Christ
on the wall of a church. Over time, more and more parishioners ob-
jected to the mural, "feeling that a portrayal of Christ with so much of
His chest bare placed more emphasis on His physical attributes than on
His spiritual qualities." 1" In 1946, during a remodeling of the church,
the mural was completely painted over. Crimi contended that this act
violated his "continued, albeit limited, proprietary interest" in the mu-
ral. °10 The court found no basis in American law to make the oblitera-
tion actionable, absent a specific reservation of rights by Crimi at the
101. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
102. Id at 252.
103. 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1949).
104. Id at 571, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
105. Id at 572, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
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time of the sale.' °6
It is fair to say that most American art owners still abide by a
belief in an unfettered right to alter or destroy artworks which they
own. To be sure, the Act's recognition of the right of integrity contra-
dicts this belief, and although some commentators may feel that such
interference is justifiable on one ground or another, 10 7 the question re-
mains whether the recognition of a right of integrity constitutes a tak-
ing of property by the state.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the taking of private property for public use without the payment of
just compensation. 08 The Act, however, obviously does not sanction
the physical taking of artwork from private owners to accomplish its
goals-it merely regulates the possession of artwork through the police
power'0 9 to benefit the greater public interest. 10 Nevertheless, it has
106. Id at 576-77, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
107. At present, owners of private collections must base their claims of ownership on
uninhibited property rights in works that may be acknowledged, quite generally, to
be of importance to the community at large. Under our present rather modest
incursions-into strict property rights, there may be a state claim that an owner may
not arbitrarily destroy a valuable work.
Price, State Arts Councils: Some Itemsfor a New Agenda, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1183, 1188
(1976) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Price, State Arts Councils].
Professor Merryman observes that
There is another sense in which the right of integrity (and the other compo-
nents of the moral right) appears to come into conflict with property rights-if by
property rights one means the right of the owner to deal with the thing as he
wishes. The right to integrity arguably reduces to some extent the owner's legal
power over the work of art by forbidding him to modify it. Consequently one
whose definition of property rights is based on a priori religious, philosophical, or
political preconceptions-as most definitions of property are-may well see the
right of integrity as an infringement or limitation of the property right of the owner
of the work of art. Conversely, a thorough positivist will insist that property rights
are defined (for legal purposes) by the positive legal order, so that the right of
integrity-like the law of nuisance or zoning-is merely one element of the legal
definition of the right of property and consequently cannot be in conflict with it.
Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 6, at 1047.
108. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. This amendment has been made applicable to the states via
the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
241 (1897).
109. The police power is the power of the state to prevent certain uses of property which
"impair the health, safety, or morals of others, or affect prejudicially the general public
welfare." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 375 (1926). "In every or-
dered society the State must act as umpire to the extent of preventing one man from so using
his property or rights as to prevent others from making a correspondingly full and free use
of their property and rights." Id
110. Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police
power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense,
an abridgement by the State of rights in property without making compensation.
But restrictions imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers
threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibi-
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become an accepted part of fifth amendment doctrine that even mere
regulation, if it "goes too far" in its restraints, is tantamount to a physi-
cal taking of property, and requires that the affected property owner be
compensated."1
Regulation to protect the physical integrity of objects of historic or
aesthetic importance has been acknowledged as being within the ambit
of the police power.1 2 Such regulation has been used with great suc-
cess in several cities under the rubric of "landmark preservation." In
New York, for example, local governments have been "empowered to
provide by regulations, special conditions and restrictions for the pro-
tection, enhancement, perpetuation and use of places, districts, sites,
buildings, structures, works of art, and other objects having a special
character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value."' " 3 The
New York City landmark preservation statute" 4 protects parcels con-
taining an "improvement," which term is defined to include works of
art,"' as well as landmark sites. It is unlawful for the owner of any
such site or parcel to alter or destroy any landmark or improvement,
other than in the course of ordinary maintenance and repair, without
the prior approval of the Landmarks Preservation Commission.
1 6
The validity of these regulations was tested in Penn Central Trans-
tion of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its
owner. The State does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The State merely
prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of
the public.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
I 1. Id at 415.
112. In speaking of the breadth of regulations which may be encompassed by the police
power, Justice Douglas has written that "it is within the power of the legislature to deter-
mine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
113. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977) (emphasis supplied) (note that there
is another § 96-a in the General Municipal Law which deals with the use of lands for neigh-
borhood youth centers).
114. NEw YORK Crry, N.Y. ADMrN. CODE, ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0-207-21.0 (1976).
115. "Improvements" is defined in the ordinance as any "building, structure, place, work
of art or other object constituting a physical betterment of real property, or any part of such
betterment." Id § 207-1.0(i).
116. Id § 207-4.0(a)(1). Once a property has been designated as a landmark site or im-
provement parcel, the owner is "under an affirmative duty to maintain the landmark in good
repair. He can only alter or demolish it if the Landmark Commission authorizes him to do
so, or after ajudicial determination." Rosensaft, New York City Landmark Preservation Law
as Applied to Radio City Music Hall, 4 ART & THE LAW 83, 84 (1979) (footnotes omitted)
[hereinafter cited as Rosensaft, Landmark Preservation].
If an owner wishes to alter or demolish a landmark, he must petition the Landmarks
Preservation Commission for a certificate of appropriateness. NEw YORK Crry, N.Y. AD-
MIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-4.0(a) (1976). The factors governing the issuance of the certificate
are found in § 207-6.0. The most common ground for requesting permission to alter or
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portation Co. v. City of New York.117 In that case, New York City had
prohibited the construction of a multi-story office structure over Grand
Central Station on the ground that the station was a landmark under
the preservation ordinance. Penn Central challenged the constitution-
ality of the regulation. The United States Supreme Court upheld gen-
erally the power of New York City to designate landmarks, and to
prevent their alteration or destruction without effecting a compensable
taking under the fifth amendment."' In upholding the New York law,
the Court found that use restrictions on property did not constitute a
taking where (1) the public interest requires such interference, (2) the
means are reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the purpose,
and (3) the use restrictions do not have an unduly harsh impact on the
owner's use of the property." 9 As long as the restrictions do not ad-
versely affect the value of the property,120 or interfere with its primary
or intended use,' 2 ' the restraints do not constitute a compensable
demolish a landmark is that the property is not capable of generating a sufficient return in its
present state. The grounds for ruling on such a claim appear in § 207-8.0.
The Commission may reject an application for a certificate of appropriateness by
merely not accepting the validity of the grounds stated in the owner's request. If the owner
claims insufficient return, the Commission may deny the request if it believes that under
"reasonably efficient management" the property could earn a reasonable return. If the
Commission finds that there is an actual hardship, it may propose a plan which, in its judg-
ment, allows for a reasonable return. The plan will usually be made up of tax credits and
exemptions for the property. The property owner has no option to reject the plan. Rosen-
saft, Landmark Preseration, supra at 84-85.
If the'owner feels that the Commission's actions are arbitrary, or amount to an abuse of
discretion, he may appeal the decision under N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 7803.3 (McKinney 1.981).
See, e.g., Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 128 n.2, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 13
n.2, 316 N.E.2d 305, 309 n.2 (1974) (designation of property as a landmark was a compensa-
ble taking where it prevented owners from demolishing a building to construct offices, where
the current building was not suitable for such use).
117. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
118. Id at 107, 136.
119. Id at 127 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962)); see Lawton
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
120. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962). In that case the
Supreme Court upheld a safety ordinance that effectively prohibited the claimant from con-
tinuing to use his property for mining purposes on the grounds that (I) the regulation did
not prevent the reasonable use of the property since the owner made no showing of an
adverse effect on the value of the land, and (2) the restriction served a "substantial public
purpose."
121. In Penn Central, Justice Brennan concluded that the restrictions under the
Landmarks Preservation Law "[did] not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Cen-
tral's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel." 438 U.S. at 136. He further
noted that the statute not only permitted, but indeed contemplated, that Penn Central may
continue to use the property precisely as it did before: as a railroad office building. Id
At another point, Justice Brennan stated that the restrictions were constitutional be-
cause they were "substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare," and because
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taking.
As to the first point, it is clear that the protection of the interests of
artists and the public in the preservation of all serious creations of fine
art requires some degree of interference with private ownership rights,
since only a small percentage of existing artwork is owned by the state.
Second, limiting the right to alter or destroy art while it remains in the
possession of the owner is indeed reasonably necessary to the preserva-
tion of the integrity of artwork, since the only other means of accom-
plishing this goal is for the state to acquire the art directly and preserve
it under its ownership. Given the recent trends of tighter state budg-
ets-particularly for the arts-and skyrocketing art prices, even if the
state could isolate those works thought to be "worthy" of preservation,
the cost of such a limited effort would still be prohibitive.
Finally, the impact of the recognition of the right of integrity on an
owner's use and possession of artwork would be negligible when as-
sessed in terms of its effect on value and the degree of interference with
the primary or intended use of the art. It is safe to say that an art
owner places little value on his ability to alter or destroy an artist's
work. In this respect he is quite different from the owner of a landmark
site, who might be expected to put a great value on his ability to alter or
destroy the landmark, for to undertake such actions might free the un-
derlying asset, the land, to be put to a more profitable use. The same
cannot be said for fine art not integrated into real property, for there
simply is no underlying asset which is made more valuable by the alter-
ation or destruction. To the contrary, such acts might well constitute
the ultimate form of devaluation of a work of fine art."zz
Further, the right of integrity would not impair the reasonable ex-
pectations surrounding the creation and possession of fine art. The pri-
mary use of a work of art, intended by artist and collector alike, is for
display and appreciation, not as a target for alteration or destruction.
Indeed, perpetuating the uninhibited right of art owners to mutilate
Penn Central was able to continue using the terminal "for its intended purposes." Id at 138
& n.36.
122. It may be argued that where the mutilated or destroyed work is one of only a few
examples of an artist's work, others of which are in the collection of an owner, the mutilation
or destruction may serve to increase the value of the works remaining intact by increasing
their rarity, thus providing a potential financial benefit to the owner from the destruction.
The relationship is at best indirect, however, for increased rarity is only one of many factors
assessed in the valuation of the remaining works. Even if it were true that such economic
benefit would accrue to the owner, thereby giving a value to the right to destroy a work, in
such circumstances, where the work is one of only a small total production by an artist, the
public's interest in the preservation of the work would be proportionately greater as well,
and would seem to outweigh the owner's speculative economic gain.
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works of art would seem to be more of a threat to the primary, intended
use than would allowing a right of integrity.
Thus, the Act's right of integrity meets the criteria established in
the Penn Central case, and appears to be a constitutionally sound exer-
cise of the police power. Curiously, though, while the right of integrity
would have allowed artist Graham Sutherland to prevent Lady
Churchill's destruction of a much-despised portrait of Sir Winston,
123 it
would not have stood to prevent the painting over of "Beverly Hills
Siddhartha," a large painting covering the exterior of a prominent Los
Angeles building, when the building changed owners.12 4 Furthermore,
it is unclear what would have been the result with respect to a brightly
painted DC-8 jet aircraft decorated by Alexander Calder, which had
been used in the regular service of a commercial airline and was re-
cently stripped of its Calder paint job as part of regular aircraft mainte-
nance. 12  This unevenhanded and uncertain application of the Act is
the result of a failure to consider adequately the problems surrounding
usable art and art on buildings.
C The Problems of Usable Art and Art on Buildings
Artistic expression often takes many unorthodox sizes, shapes, and
colors. More often in recent years, however, such expression has been
123. In 1954, the late artist Graham Sutherland was commissioned by Parliament to paint
a portrait of Churchill as a gift for his 80th birthday. After seeing the final product, Church-
ill reportedly commented that the glowering, semi-crouching pose made him look as if he
were sitting on the toilet. His wife promised family members that the portrait would "never
see the light of day." After Lady Churchill died, it was revealed that she had indeed de-
stroyed the painting some years earlier. Sutherland was not unduly distressed, but viewed
the destruction as an act of vandalism. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 13, 1978, § 1, at 5, col. I.
124. A group of artists who called themselves the "Los Angeles Fine Arts Squad" was
hired by the owner of a highly visible building on La Cienega Boulevard in Los Angeles to
execute an enormous painting which covered most of the building's exterior. The work was
entitled "Beverly Hills Siddhartha," and attracted a great deal of public attention. After a
year or so, a new owner acquired the building and had the entire mural painted over. MER-
RYmAN & ELSEN, supra note 4, at 4-41.
125. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 12, 1979, § II, at 5, col. 1. The jet, decorated under the
supervision of Calder in 1973 at a price of $100,000, was stripped of paint as part of a
regular maintenance procedure of its owner, Braniff Airlines, whereby the fuselage is
checked for corrosion. The plane was to be repainted in the normal color scheme of the
Braniff fleet. A Braniff official stated that the company had decided not to repaint the jet as it
had been decorated by Calder, since "filt would be recreating a work of art without the artist
himself present."
Opinion among the local art community was split. One Dallas sculptor and art restorer
viewed the Calder jet as a "national treasure" and objected to the airline's action. The
curator of a Dallas museum, however, did not view the stripping of the paint as a tragedy,
saying that "We [museum curators] never considered the plane a work of art." Id
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appearing on many unconventional types of support-specifically,
upon objects of utility such as automobiles, furniture, and other house-
hold items rather than the traditional canvas or paper.
When artwork merely appears on a utilitarian object, which
neither the artist nor the collector intends for use other than display as
a work of art, there is no problem in applying drolt moral to that object
the same as with any other creation. If we accept the rationale that it is
the artist and his expression that are being protected, the support to
which that expression is affixed is of no importance. The refrigerator
decorated by Bernard Buffet, previously discussed, is a perfect example
of such art.
Serious questions arise, however, with respect to the unmodified
application of drolt moral to art on buildings and what has been called
"usable art"-art which falls within the suggested definition of fine art,
but which also is incorporated into an object that actively continues to
serve some useful purpose."l 6 The owners of such buildings or useful
objects, in dealing with them only as such and not as works of fine art,
may find it necessary or desirable to commit acts of destruction or al-
teration affecting the incorporated work of fine art. In so doing, how-
ever, the owner comes into direct conflict with the interests of the artist
and the public protected by the Act.
The Act presently responds to this conflict by separating fine art on
buildings from all other art, and all but excluding it from meaningful
protection: if the work of art cannot be removed from the building
without substantial damage to the work, the Act does not apply unless
the artist reserved his moral rights in a writing signed by the building
owner and properly recorded; if the work can be so removed, then the
moral rights shall apply, but only to allow the artist to remove the work
at his own expense. Thus, if the work of art is sufficiently well-attached
or prohibitively expensive to remove, both likely circumstances with
building art, the Act's protections will not apply in most circumstances.
It must be stressed that the Act, even in its present form, does not define
126. Usable Art, still an evolving category, is made both for aesthetic contemplation
and for serviceability. It is essentially sculpture-that is, it is three-dimensional-
but it is sculpture that can be sat on, eaten from, worn, flown, driven; it can be used
to light a room, or to divide a space.
... [T]oday's artists rarely conceive their pieces as prototypes for mass pro-
duction. Like other artworks, their clothing, furniture, lamps, and so on are pro-
duced either in editions or as unique items. Most works of Usable Art are intended
as serious and important art statements; they are not spinoffs, private amusements,
or pay-the-rent schemes.
Perrault, Usable -rt, 3 PORTFOLIO 60, 61-62 (July/Aug. 1981).
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fine art to exclude art on buildings; to the contrary, by providing pro-
tection under limited circumstances, the Act implicitly recognizes that
protectable fine art may appear on buildings. The practical exclusion
of such art from protection is merely an ad hoc legislative determina-
tion that the building owner's interest in using his property shall prevail
in nearly all situations.
The problems posed by usable art, on the other hand, may well be
definitional. Usable art is never mentioned in the Act as being within
the "fine art" category, and the resulting uncertainty surrounding its
treatment is troubling. One art critic has argued that none of the many
useful objects which are decorated with painting, embroidery, carvings
or inlays may be considered works of fine art.'27 Fortunately, this posi-
tion has not been adopted by the Legislature, which recently passed a
special statute which provides that works of painting on porcelain, pre-
sumably including such useful objects as cups, dishes and vases, are to
be protected as works of fine art. 2 ' How much further the Legislature
might go in protecting such objects is open to speculation.
The problem posed by art on useful objects was also wrestled with
at great length by the customs courts, where the standard ultimately
settled upon was whether the primary value, use, or character of the
object was as a work of fine art or as a utilitarian article; only those
objects in which the artistic attributes predominated were classified as
"fine art."' 29 Persuasive evidence of this characteristic is found where
127. [E]very ornament must have a content. Its content, however, is affected by its
function. An ornament is almost always a part of something else. It is an attribute
meant visually to interpret the character of a given object or situation or happen-
ing. It sets a mood; it helps define the rank and raison d'tre of a tool, a piece of
furniture, a room, a person, a ceremony... .Being a part of something else, the
ornament is specific in nature--that is, its content is limited to the particular char-
acter of its carrier. Such a limitation is inadmissible in the work of art proper.
Whereas the ornament is a part of the world in which we live, the work of art is an
image of that world. . . .The work of art is either quite independent of its envi-
ronment, as, for example, in the neutral setting of a museum, where in contemplat-
ing the work we forget what is around it, or, as in a stage performance, it is the
center and climax of a place designed to make us receive the view of the world that
is represented in the work.
R. ARNHEIM, ART AND VISUAL PERCEPTION 135 (1966), quoted in Karlen, What is Ar?
supra note 88, at 403-04.
128. CAL. Civ. CODE § 997 (West 1982). The text of this provision is quoted supra note
85.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Olivotti & Co., 7 C.C.P.A. 46 (1916). The court was decid-
ing whether marble chairs, the arms of which were sculpted to form lions' heads, were works
of fine art. The court said: 'These carvings... were evidently designed as an embellish-
ment of the seats, and it would be going far to say that of themselves they were sufficient to
give the character of sculptures to the entirety of which they are a minor, not a predominat-
ing, part." Id at 49. The court concluded that when an artist makes a utilitarian object
more beautiful, the completed work reaches no higher plane than the purely decorative arts,
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the object has "'no utilitarian value at all proportionate to . . [its]
cost.' "" Such a standard would be inappropriate for the purposes of
the Act since, as with the Act's present definition of fine art discussed
earlier, it focuses too much attention on the object and not on the inter-
ests protected.
The task of accommodating the conflicting interests involved in a
workable standard is a difficult one, and not easily accomplished by
being arbitrary in the case of building art and unclear with respect to
usable art. The interests of the artist, the public, and the owner are
similar enough with respect to both categories of art, however, so that
by focusing on those interests, a single standard may be derived which
is suitable for application to both. Toward this end, it is suggested that
subdivisions (h)(1) and (h)(2) of the Act, dealing with art on buildings,
be deleted in their entirety and replaced by the following:
(h)(1) With respect to works of fine art incorporated into im-
provements upon real property, such as buildings, or into use-
ful objects of personal property, if the owner of such property
wishes to make use of it in such a manner that he shall, in the
course of such use, intentionally commit, or authorize the in-
tentional commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation,
alteration, or destruction of the incorporated work of fine art,
the rights and duties created under this section shall not apply
if the trier of fact determines that the owner's interest in mak-
ing such use of his property outweighs the injury to the inter-
ests of the artist and the public which results from such use.
In making this determination, the trier of fact shall consider,
among other relevant evidence:
(A) the value of the work of fine art in relation to
the value of the property as a whole;
unless the artwork is so compelling that the utilitarian aspects of the article are "lost in the
realized sentiment of the artist." Id at 49-50. Contra, Karlen, What isArtZ supra note 88,
at 395.
130. United States v. Ehrich, 22 C.C.P.A. 1, 11 (1934) (Bland, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Baumgarten & Co., 2 Ct. Cust. App. 321, 322 (1911)). At issue in Ehrich
was whether certain vases could be classified as works of art. The dissenting justice dis-
agreed with the majority's finding that the vases were not works of art, noting, among other
factors, that the inventoried value of the vases ranged as high as 2,400 French francs, which
precluded the conclusion that the objects were designed to be mere vases. Justice Bland's
dissent in Ehrich has been cited with approval as a more accurate statement of the standard
to be applied than that used by the majority. See Ebeling & Reuss Co. v. United States, 40
Cust. Ct. 387, 394 (1958) (holding that ornamental vases and decanters are works of art).
The Ebeling court stated that the majority opinion in Ehrich had been effectively overruled
by subsequent case law. Id
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(B) the injury to the personality and reputation of
the artist;
(C) the public interest in the preservation of, or in
allowing the mutilation, defacement, alteration or destruction
of, the work of fine art;
(D) the necessity of the owner's actions with re-
spect to his property which are detrimental to the incorpo-
rated work of art, and the availability of reasonable
alternatives to such actions.
(h)(2) Any person who commits, or authorizes the com-
mission of, any act of defacement, mutilation, alteration, or
destruction of a work of fine art in the course of the ordinary
use, maintenance or repair of such property shall not have
violated this section so long as such acts were not performed
with gross negligence, as defined in subdivision (c)(2) of this
section.
The proposal offers several improvements over the Act's current
scheme. First, it does not require that the artist reserve his moral rights
in a signed, recorded writing in order to protect a work of fine art per-
manently executed on a building. Such a requirement has no place in a
moral rights statute because it places too much emphasis on the negoti-
ating strength of the artist at the time the work is created. It also leaves
the artist no better protected than at common law under Crimi v.
Rutgers Presbyterian Church ,1 where the court held that Crimi could
have reserved his moral rights by contract. Also, the proposed amend-
ment does not hinge protection of art on buildings upon the artist's
financial ability to remove his creation. In addition to relaxing the
Act's present treatment of art on buildings, proposed subdivision (h)(1)
would resolve any uncertainties as to the status of usable art by specifi-
cally recognizing such a category, and providing that it be treated in the
same manner as art on buildings.
Under proposed subdivision (h)(1), the trier of fact would be free,
with respect to both categories of art, to consider a wide range of fac-
tors in its determination of whether and to what extent the artist's or
the owner's interests should prevail, and to exercise its broad remedial
powers to fashion a flexible remedy which accommodates as many of
those interests as possible. The new (h)(2) would relieve the owner
from the risk that normal use and care of his property would violate the
131. 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1949). For discussion of the facts of the case, see
supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
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Act, but the gross negligence standard would prevent an owner from
being so callous with respect to the property that the incorporated art-
work is needlessly endangered or damaged.
Thus, rather than having a free hand to alter or destroy a work of
fine art on a building merely by showing either that the artist did not
reserve his moral rights in the work, or that the artist could not remove
the work in time, the owner would at least have to make some showing
that the work of fine art substantially interfered with the planned use of
the property and that all reasonable alternatives had been explored
before a court would allow the defacing of a mural or other art object
which may, now or in the future, form a meaningful and important
part of the state's religious, cultural or artistic heritage. On the other
hand, the standard is flexible enough to allow for the stripping of paint
from the Calder Jet, for instance, if an adequate showing were made to
indicate that the action was necessary in the interest of passenger
safety.
Another complicating feature in the episode surrounding the Cal-
der Jet was that Alexander Calder was no longer living at the time his
painting was removed. If there were indeed a violation of droit moral,
who would assert it on Calder's behalf? The class of persons who have
been granted standing to enforce the rights guaranteed by the Act has
been limited to the artist during his lifetime, and a narrow range of
others after his death. In many cases, after the artist's death, the self-
interest of those who have been granted standing to sue may conflict
with both the artist's own sensitivities and priorities expressed during
his lifetime, and the public's interest in the preservation of the artwork,
with the possible result that the integrity of the artwork will be severely
compromised.
. Standing to Enforce Droit Moral
During his lifetime, the artist alone may be relied upon to resist
changes in his works and to enforce his moral rights.' 32 As a corollary
to this power, the artist should also have the right to ratify and accept
modifications made in his works by others. "While the creator is alive,
the interest of society in preserving the integrity of the work is at a
minimum, for who can judge better than the creator what constitutes
the true and ultimate form of the work."'133 Thus, it should be the case
132. DESKBOOK, supra note 51, at 845.
133. Roeder, Doctrine of Moral Right, supra note 44, at 570. Professors Nimmer and
Price disagree with the position that the artist's rights are paramount during his lifetime.
They suggest that some individual or entity should be empowered to enforce moral rights on
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that, during the artist's lifetime, no other individual or group should be
able to interfere with the artist's decision to enforce or not to enforce
his moral rights. The Act adopts this viewpoint.
134
The Act further provides that after the death of the artist, the art-
ist's rights may be enforced by his heir, or personal representative for a
period of 50 years following the artist's death.135 Several commentators
have suggested that after the death of the artist, those who have inher-
ited the moral rights of the artist may find themselves more interested
in pecuniary gain than in representation of the deceased artist's or the
public's interest in the integrity of the surviving works. 136 Several cases
of such conflict of interests have been documented, the most notable of
which involves the late sculptor David Smith.
After Smith's death, the executors of his estate, among them a
well-known art critic, an artist, and a lawyer, 137 sent tremors through
the art community by their handling of several of Smith's large metal
sculptures. Some were deliberately stripped of their brightly-colored
paint by sandblasting, allowed to rust, and then varnished. Others
were left outdoors where the paint eventually cracked, chipped and
peeled off at the hands of the elements.13s A clue to the motivation
behind the executor's actions may have been that many of Smith's ear-
her sculptures were composed of unpainted metal, and in general those
behalf of the public where the artist, although still living, is not concerned with the violation
of moral rights. Nimmer & Price, Moral Rights and Beyond, supra note 32, at 9-10.
134. CAL. Cwy. CODE § 987(e) (West 1982).
135. Id. § 987(g)(1). The French law is very similar, but adopts a hierarchy of classes of
persons which may enforce the deceased artist's rights. Article 19 of the Law of March 11,
1957, supra note 38, provides that after the death of the artist, the rights shall be exercised by
the executors of the estate during their lives. If there are no executors, or after the death of
the last of them, the rights shall be exercised by (1) descendants, (2) the spouse, (3) heirs,
and (4) general legatees, in that order of preference. Article 20 gives the court supervisory
powers, and allows the court to exercise the rights where the above inheritance fails, or
where there has been a disinheritance. Sarraute, French MoralfRiht, supra note 22, at 483.
Not all rights are said to pass to the heirs and descendants, however. It has been sug-
gested that the "positive" rights-the rights to create, publish, alter or withdraw-die with
the author. Only the "negative" components--the right to enjoin alteration or other detri-
mental acts committed against the work or the artist's reputation-are transmitted at death.
Only the latter rights require no personal action or creative judgment by the artist himself.
Strauss, Moral Right, supra note 24, at 517-18.
136. For instance, the heirs may be willing to publish a work the artist thought to be
.incomplete or inferior, or to authorize a profitable adaptation or reproduction regardless of
the quality. DEsKooic, supra note 51, at 806. Lacking the artist's sensitivities and priori-
ties, the heirs may agree to accept compensation for the destruction or defacement of the
work of art. Nimmer & Price, Moral Rights and Beyond, supra note 32, at 10.
137. Respectively, Clement Greenberg, Robert Motherwell, and Ira Lowe.
138. Krauss, Changing the Works of David Smith, 62 ART IN AMERICA 30 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Krauss, David Smith].
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works drew higher prices than Smith's painted work. 13 9 Regardless of
their lack of commercial success, however, these experiments in painted
sculpture make up an important chapter in the artist's development. 4
The executors claimed that the results were faithful to the artist's
intention, even though a similar stripping of one sculpture during
Smith's lifetime incurred the wrath of the artist, who denounced the
work as "partially destroyed."'141 Incidents such as this show that the
heirs and representatives of the deceased artist are not necessarily the
most effective guardians of the public interest, and demonstrate the
need for broadening the range of potential enforcers to include true
139. DESKBOOK, supra note 51, at 845. One reason for this difference in value was the
influence of executor Clement Greenberg, an art critic himself, who constantly denigrated
the painted works, even during Smith's lifetime. Id One writer has accused Greenberg of
implementing, without Smith's consent, an "alternative realization" of the artist's intentions.
In stripping the paint off the sculptures, Greenberg "revised not only certain works but the
esthetic scenario of Smith's last period." Kramer, Questions Raised by Art Alterations, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 14, 1974, § 1, at 25, col. 1.
A similar dispute arose out of the work of the late Constantin Brancusi, a modern sculp-
tor. Brancusi's personal representative was accused of making "unethical reproductions" of
Brancusi's sculptures out of a material that Brancusi had renounced. The representative
replied that he, as the person designated by the artist, is the extension of the personality of
the artist. By definition, he stated, it was impossible for him to infringe on Brancusi's right of
authorship. Nimmer & Price, Moral Rights and Beyond, supra note 32, at 11.
140. "Smith's was a complex mind, and among its complexities was a burning ambition
to take constructed sculpture a step beyond. . . to join the syntax of constructed sculpture
to the esthetic of color, and thus produce a sculpture in which both construction and color
were given co-equal power." Kramer, Questions Raised by Art Alterations, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 14, 1974, at 25, col. 1. Smith painted, stripped, and repainted works himself several
times over, rarely satisfied, never completely realizing his goals. Id
141. Smith wrote the following letters to two art journals following the mutilation of his
work.
Since my sculpture, 17h's (44 3/4 inches high), 1950, painted cadmium alumi-
num red, during the process of sale and resale, has suffered a willful act of vandal-
ism.... I renounce it as my original work and brand it a ruin.
My name cannot be attributed to it, and I shall exercise my legal rights against
anyone making this misrepresentation.
All persons involved in this act of vandalism will be, to the best of my ability,
prohibited from acquiring any more of my work.
I declare its value to be only its weight of 60 lbs. of scrap steel. [letter to
ARTNEWs].
My sculpture 17h's, made in 1950, painted with six coats of cadmium alumi-
num red, has been partially destroyed by one or more parties involved in its sale
and donation to a collection.
This willful work of vandalism causes me to deny this work and refuse any
future sale to any of those connected with this vandalism.
I tried to repurchase this work but was refused. There seems to be little legal
protection for an artist in. our country against vandalism or even destruction.
Lacking full proof, I cannot name the guilty participants; but I ask other artists to
beware. Possibly we should start an action for protective laws. [letter to ARTs].
Krauss, David Smith, supra note 138, at 32-33.
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representatives of the public interest who may enforce the artist's rights
when those who should be primarily responsible do not act.
A related problem is the rather short duration of the rights and
duties under the Act-the life of the artist plus 50 years.1 42 This is
significantly different from the French droit moral and that of other
countries, where the moral right is perpetual.143 This means that under
the Act, few works created prior to 1900 would be protected; as Profes-
sors Nimmer and Price have noted, "[w]hile there are many droit moral
questions involving contemporary artists, a great threat to the integrity
of works of art relates to more ancient pieces. . . ." 144 It is important,
then, that some person or entity be given standing to enforce moral
rights beyond the time when rights in the heirs and others expire.
The original version of the Act responded to these needs not only
by recognizing a public interest in the preservation of art, but by grant-
ing standing to enforce the Act to any person acting in the public inter-
est,'14 and provided that with respect to such persons the rights and
duties under the Act shall exist in perpetuity. 46 In light of the obvious
caution being exercised by the Legislature in introducing droft moral
into California, however, it is not surprising that a grant to all persons
of rights of preservation in all artwork in California gave some mem-
bers of the Legislature pause. In the end, provisions granting rights to
the general public were deleted, and the Act became law retaining the
specifically recognized public interest, but with no means by which it
could be enforced.
To the extent that a public interest is still recognized, however, the
choice of an enforcer of the public's rights is significant. As we have
experienced, the artist's heirs and representatives may have at best con-
flicting interests in many crucial circumstances. Other countries have
also recognized this problem, and have dealt with it in a number of
ways. In France, for instance, in. addition to a hierarchy of heirs, lega-
tees, representatives, and the like who are entitled to sue on behalf of
the deceased artist, the establishment of a legal entity for this purpose is
also permitted. 47 Other nations provide for such enforcement by a
142. CAL. CIw. CODE § 987(g)(1) (West 1982).
143. Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra, note 6, at 1041-42.
144. Nimmer & Price, Moral Rights and Beyond, supra note 32, at 8.
145. S. 2143, § 987(d) (1978) (as introduced).
146. Id § 987(e)(1).
147. Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra, note 6, at 1042. The concept of entity standing has
had an uneven history in the French courts, however. The Society of Men of Letters, a
French society of professional writers, once sought an injunction against the use of a novel's
title in connection with a film based on the novel, and a preliminary injunction was granted.
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public official in pursuance of the public interest.1 48
It is suggested that a similar provision be included in the Act, both
to increase the degree of protection for artists and their works, and to
bring the Act substantially in line with its civil law counterparts. For-
tunately, an appropriate entity for this role already exists in the Cali-
fornia Arts Council. 149 The Act should be amended to grant the Arts
Council perpetual standing to enforce the moral rights of artists, as an
additional party during the 50 years following an artist's death, and the
only entity with standing thereafter. Such involvement by the Arts
Council is arguably well within its legislative mandate, wherein the
Council is empowered to employ personnel and promulgate regulations
necessary to "[elncourage artistic awareness, participation and expres-
sion"'15 and to ensure "the fullest expression of our artistic poten-
tial."'151 Moreover, it has been suggested that droit moral is a particular
area where the Arts Council might be of utility in effectuating the
"public right to share reasonably in the aesthetic value of a work of
art."'
52
When the case was brought to trial on the merits, the Society presented questionable argu-
ments in justification of its capacity to represent the interests of deceased authors who had
not themselves ever been Society members, and consequently the Seine Tribunal, the Paris
Court of Appeal, and the Court of Cassation all ruled that the Society could not continue its
case. Sarraute, French Moral Right, supra note 22, at 483-84.
In another case, the National Literary Fund-a governmental entity created for the task
of "protecting the integrity of literary works, regardless of their country of origin, which,
after the author's death, have fallen into the public domain"-sought to have confiscated a
distorted abridgment of Victor Hugo's Les Miskrables. The Seine Tribunal rejected the suit,
however, based on a conflict between the statutory mandate of the Foundation and Article 6
of the Law of March 11, 1957, supra, note 38. The Tribunal found that the latter law, pro-
viding that the artist's right of integrity must be exercised by a hierarchy comprised of the
artist's executors, descendants, spouse, heirs, and others, took priority. Since Victor Hugo
had heirs who were still living, they alone could sue. Sarraute, French Moral Right, supra
note 22, at 484.
148. Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 6, at 1042.
149. See supra note 20.
150. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8753(a) (West 1980).
151. Id § 8753(e).
152. Price, State Arts Councils, supra note 107, at 1188. Professor Price goes on to say:
[T]raditional European concepts require that ownership of a Rembrandt does not
include a right to deface the painting. Such a limitation on ownership does not
necessarily spring from the work itself; it might be found in the relationship of the
work to the community. The object is part of the body of society's cultural wealth.
One individual, by virtue of temporary custody of the work, does not have the right
to mar or destroy it.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The California Art Preservation Act is a creative new step in the
direction of increasing artists' rights in their works, and preserving an
already rich legacy of creativity and culture in the state. As a modem
enactment of an ancient doctrine, the Act is in a unique position to
refine, improve, and expand upon the statutory and decisional law of
droit moral which has developed in the civil law countries over the past
several decades. Though the Act, like its foreign counterparts, pres-
ently contains several flaws, through careful, thoughtful amendment
and interpretation it will be capable of providing protections superior
even to those which exist in Europe, the birthplace of droit moral.
